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Abstract
The paper presents a couple of findings of a study 
in wireless LAN security (WLAN) in German 
companies and federal authorities. The study was 
conducted in spring 2009. On the basis of a directory 
of security measures we formulate hypotheses 
derived from several studies in WLAN security. We 
analyze how the situation in Germany fits these 
assumptions. Degree of familiarity, frequency of use 
and reasons for not using wireless LAN security 
measures are being investigated. Furthermore, we 
discuss correlations between companies’ charac-
teristics and the use of security measures.  
1 Introduction 
The integration of computer systems into a 
comprehensive network is one of the key elements 
for companies and federal authorities’ effective and 
flexible work. Wireless solutions are increasing the 
flexibility and mobility here. Wireless local area 
networks (WLANs) are an important technology in 
this area. The main focus of criticism, regarding the 
use of WLANs, is their lack of security [1], [2], [3], 
[4]. For example, a Europe-wide study from 
Motorola Research shows that more than half of the 
observed 400 companies have insufficiently secured 
WLANs [5]. On the one hand there exist a lot of 
security measures, but on the other hand there is a 
great lack in the appropriate use of them. In this case 
potential attackers can easily gain access to mission 
critical data or crash security relevant applications. 
After a first survey concerning the status quo in 
WLAN security in 2006 [6], [7] we restarted the 
investigation in spring 2009. In this paper we 
summarize selected results of this explorative study 
in order to find answers to a plenty of questions like: 
x How popular and known are security 
measures for WLANs? 
x Which security measures are used by 
companies and federal authorities, which are 
not and why? 
x Are there correlations between companies’ 
characteristics and the use of security 
measures? 
In the next section of the paper we show how the 
empirical study was prepared and conducted and we 
present our directory of WLAN security measures. In 
the third section we describe and discuss the results 
of the survey. Finally we summarize our results and 
close with an outlook for future research questions. 
2 Methodology 
Main objective of our survey is a state of the art 
report of WLAN security in German companies and 
federal authorities. To specify the above mentioned 
questions we formulated hypotheses dealing with the 
use of WLAN security measures, reasons for non-use 
and several other problems. These hypotheses were 
derived from various studies in WLAN security [1], 
[2], [3], [4], [5], [8], [9], [10], [11], and combined 
with our results from the previous study [6], [7] to 
serve as basis for the online questionnaire [12].  
The questionnaire is divided in three sections. The 
first part is devoted to the characteristics of the 
respondents. In the second part we are gathering 
information dealing with the respondents WLAN 
infrastructure. The third and main part contains the 
questions concerning the WLAN security measures. 
Basis of this part is a directory of categorized WLAN 
security measures [13]. We have compiled a set of 
53 security measures which were classified into the 
following four main classes:  
i. organizational measures before use 
ii. organizational measures during operation 
iii. hardware measures 
iv. software measures 
The directory is a result of an analysis of several 
standard publications in the WLAN security field 
e.g.: information sheets concerning WLAN security 
of the German Federal Office for Information 
Security BSI [4], [8], [14], the security specification 
of the IEEE standard family 802.11 [11], the 
ISO/IEC 27000 standard family [15], [16] and other 
publications [17], [18]. Table 1 shows this 
compilation. 
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Table 1. Directory of WLAN security measures 
Organizational measures before use Hardware measures 
Defining a security concept for the WLAN infrastructure 26: Choose suitable WLAN equipment (signal equipment: e.g. OFDM/DSSS) and standards (IEEE 802.11g, etc.) 
01: Define the needs, objectives and purpose of the WLAN 
infrastructure 
27: Use a centralized management component for administration 
and monitoring of the WLAN (e.g. Wireless Switch) 
02: Define requirements for security objectives 28: Power on the WLAN-equipment only while using, or use time-controlled activation 
03: Assess the protection requirements and performing a risk 
analysis 
29: Achieve signal encapsulation trough structural measures (e.g. 
shielding) 
04: Create WLAN policy 
30: Lend registered WLAN cards and exchange WLAN cards 
regularly Rollout planning 
05: Define the work place of WLAN infrastructure Software measures 
06: Regard environmental factors (sources of interference, 
structural environment) Configuration and administration of WLAN devices 
07: Perform measurement planning (detection of signal strength) 
31: Change factory presets 
32: Deactivate the ad-hoc-networking ability 
08: Choose suitable antennas and the position for the access 
points that provides optimum WLAN coverage 33: Use own (secure) SSID 
09: Configure the channel allocation without overlapping (max. 3 
parallel channels at 802.11b, g and max. 8 parallel channel at 
802.11a) 
34: Disable SSID broadcasting 
35: Maximise beacon interval 
10: Check the WLAN operation with the help of network scans and 
log-files inspection 36: Disable DHCP at the access points 
Other organizational measures before WLAN installation 37: Secure the connection between central authentication server (e.g. RADIUS) and access points 
11: Perform tests prior to the actual WLAN installation 38: Use only one WLAN standard, instead more parallel (e.g. 'G-only' or 'B-only') 
12: Develop emergency strategies to handle sudden security 
threats 39: Use block-intra-BSS-traffic in public areas 
13: Define access passwords for WLAN and LAN independently Apply authentication mechanisms 
14: Train and sensitize the users 40: Authentication via MAC-address filter mechanisms 
15: Train administrators 41: Open system authentication 
16: Create documentation of WLAN infrastructure 42: Pre-shared key authentication 
Organizational measures during operation 
43: 802.1X/EAP authentication 
Apply encryption mechanisms 
17: Examine the compliance with data security regulations 
periodically
44: WEP encryption 
45: WPA encryption 
18: Monitor the WLAN with the help of network scans and log-files 
inspection regularly 
46: WPA2 or IEEE 802.11i encryption 
47: VPN/IPsec (encryption on IP level) 
19: Monitor the use of security measures under urgent security 
threats Other software-technical measures 
20: Limit access to the access points to authorized staff 48: Separate WLAN and wired networks on the network level (e.g. via packet filter, VPN or VLAN) 
21: Don’t administrate the access points via WLAN interface 
respectively unsecure administration accounts 
49: Maintain software updates at the access points and WLAN 
devices regularly 
22: Check the WLAN policy regularly 50: Install a personal firewall at the WLAN-device 
23: Check accessibility and integrity of the access points on-site 
regularly 51: Change WLAN key at access points regularly 
24: Check configuration of the access points and WLAN 
equipment regularly 52: Use intrusion detection systems to monitor the WLAN 
25: Update the documentation of the WLAN infrastructure regularly 53: Restrict file and resource sharing on devices, which are connected with the WLAN 
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We have asked the audience for each security 
measure
x if the specific measure is known 
x and when yes, if it is used, 
x if known but not used, we asked why not? 
For the questioning we used a web-based tool 
(http://www.datenassistent.de) and as an alternative 
we made an offline-version (printable PDF-file) 
available.
After some pre-tests with hand-picked enterprises 
we carried out the investigation in cooperation with 
TeleTrusT Germany e.V. and the IT company 
NetSys.IT during the period April to June 2009.  
As sample we selected enterprises and federal 
authorities which may have a relative high number of 
WLAN installations and therefore a high level of 
interest in solving WLAN security problems. So, we 
invited via e-Mail  
i. the 110 enterprises of the main German 
stock indices (DAX, MDAX, TecDAX), 
ii. the 94 members of the TeleTrusT Germany 
e.V. and 
iii. approx. 100 security administrators of the 
federal administrations in Germany. 
In addition to that we published a call for 
participation in two German key journals for 
information security (DuD - circulation 2.300 and 
<kes> - circulation 8.800) and in several information 
security or IT focused internet portals (e.g. http:// 
www.heise.de/security, http://www.securitymanager. 
de, http://www.sicher-im-netz.de). 
3. Results 
210 enterprises and federal authorities took part in 
the survey. 115 of the 210 participants are using 
WLAN infrastructures, 12 more are planning the use. 
So we have 127 participants, 80 of them answered 
the questionnaire part, dealing with the security 
measures, completely and they are becoming the 
universe of research (nc=80) for the upcoming 
analysis. The structure of the survey participants is as 
follows (The participants had the choice to state ‚no 
entry’ for each question, that’s why the sum of the 
individual values is sometimes not 100%):
i. concerning branch 
x 73.8% enterprises,  
x 32.5% service enterprises 
x 18.8% industrial enterprises 
x 16.3% ICT companies 
x 6.3% commercial enterprises 
x 13.8% federal authorities 
ii. concerning size 
x 32.5% large ( >250 employees) 
x 13.8% medium (51-250 employees) 
x 12.5% small (10-50 employees) 
x 25.0% micro (<10 employees) 
iii. concerning geographical distribution 
x 25.0% from North Rhine-Westphalia 
x 16.3% from Bavaria 
x 8.8% from Baden-Wuertemberg 
x 8.8% from Hesse 
x 8.8% from Thuringia 
x 5.0% from Saxony-Anhalt 
iv. concerning the position of the participants 
within the institution 
x 63.8% member of IT department 
x 11.3% member of management 
x 3.8% member of non-IT departments  
Our analysis is limited to methods of descriptive 
statistics. In the following sections we discuss 
selected hypotheses using frequencies, arithmetic 
means and variances. We refrain from significance 
tests, because our sample is not a random one.
3.1. Use of WLAN security measures and 
reasons for non-use
Hypothesis 1:  Companies and federal authorities 
prefer technical measures to protect 
their WLAN infrastructure more 
than organizational measures! 
The protection of a WLAN infrastructure requires 
both organizational and technical measures. But, 
compared to technical measures organizational 
measures often require much more effort. That’s why 
we assumed the preference of technical measures.  
But it failed; we found that the participants use more 
(44.0%) organizational measures than technical 
measures (25.6%). This is illustrated in table 2, 
which shows in percentage terms the frequency of 
use of security measures. Within the top ten list we 
found only two technical measures. 
Table 2. Tops/flops of used WLAN security measures 
Measure/ Description Class Frequency 
of use 
05: Define the work place of 
WLAN infrastructure 
organizational 67.5% 
01: Define the needs, 
objectives and purpose of the 
WLAN infrastructure 
organizational 62.5% 
31: Change factory presets technical 61.3% 
02: Define requirements for 
security objectives 
organizational 58.8% 
21: Don’t administrate the 
access points via WLAN 
interface respectively unsecure 
administration accounts 
organizational  56.3% 
15: Train administrators organizational  55.0% 
06: Regard environmental 
factors (sources of interference, 
structural environment) 
organizational 53.8% 
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13: Define access passwords 
for WLAN and LAN 
independently 
organizational  53.8% 
16: Create documentation of 
WLAN infrastructure 
organizational 52.5% 
33: Use own (secure) SSID technical 50.0% 
40: Authentication via MAC-
address filter mechanisms 
technical 18.8% 
43: 802.1X/EAP authentication technical 18.8% 
35: Maximise beacon interval technical 13.8% 
51: Change WLAN key at 
access points regularly 
technical 13.8% 
52: Use intrusion detection 
systems to monitor the WLAN 
technical 13.8% 
29: Achieve signal 
encapsulation trough structural 
measures (e.g. shielding) 
technical 12.5% 
41: Open system authentication technical 10.0% 
39: Use block-intra-BSS-traffic 
in public areas 
technical 6.3% 
30: Lend registered WLAN 
cards and exchange WLAN 
cards regularly 
technical 5.0% 
44: WEP encryption technical 5.0% 
Hypothesis 2:  Main reasons for the non-use of 
security measures are lack of 
knowledge, high effort of imple-
mentation and use, and minor 
effects!
Manuals, guidebooks and papers often 
concentrate on few, selected measures [2], [3], [4], 
[18]. Often the focus is on the IEEE 802.11 standard 
family. A lot of organizational and technical aspects 
are too short or mentioned as a side issue. This is the 
reason for our assumption that most of the 
participants have a lack of knowledge concerning the 
majority of WLAN security measures and therefore 
do not make use of it. We expected also that another 
main reason for the non-use is the high effort of 
implementation and use and minor effects.  
The results of our investigation showed that the 
participants knew only 55.4% of 53 measures 
mentioned in the questionnaire. 44.6% of the 
measures are unknown. Thus, lack of knowledge is 
the main reason for non-use.  
We could observe the greatest lack of knowledge 
especially in the software- and hardware measures 
classes (see Figure 1). Furthermore we can see that 
the participants did not use all the measures they 
knew. Quit obvious is the difference between known 
and used security measures also in the above 
mentioned classes. 
25,9%
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38,2%
47,3%
44,9%
48,0%
62,4%
68,9%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
sof tware
measures
hardware
measures 
organizational
measures 
during use
organizational
measures 
before use
known
used
Security measures classes
Known/used security measures in percentage terms
(nC = 80)
Figure 1. Degree of familiarity and frequency of use 
according to measure classes  
This mismatch becomes more evident when we 
analyze individual measures (see figure 2): e.g. only 
5.0% of the participants using WEP encoding even 
though they knew it.  
20,0%
41,3%
23,8%
5,0%
38,8%
50,0%
45,0%
46,3%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
VPN/
IPsec
WPA2/
802.11i
WPA
WEP
Known/used security measures in percentage terms
known
used
Security measures (encoding standards)
(nC = 80)
Figure 2. Degree of familiarity and frequency of use of 
encoding standards 
So we must identify other reasons, beside the lack 
of knowledge, which are responsible for the non-use 
of specific measures. The analysis of the explained 
reasons of the participants has emphasized the 
second part of our hypothesis. 27.4% of participants 
questioned said that the high effort of imple-
mentation and use is the reason for non-use, 19.2% 
mentioned the minor effects. 43.1% are already 
planning the use of security measure, so we might 
see a significant increase in the use of security 
measures in the near future.  
We have also analyzed the reasons for non-use for 
specific security measures and found that for 
hardware-technical measures the high effort of 
implementation and use is the main reason. 
3.2. Correlations between company-specific 
characteristics and WLAN security measures 
Hypothesis 3:  Information and communication 
technology (ICT) companies using 
more security measures compared 
to other branches and federal 
authorities! 
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ICT companies have a lot of experience and 
knowledge in the field of computer based 
communication and information management. That’s 
why we assume a greater sensibility for security 
questions and therefore a more frequent use of 
security measures than in other branches.  
But our analysis showed that federal authorities 
(47.4%) and industrial enterprises (45.6%) use more 
of the 53 in the questionnaire mentioned security 
measures than ICT companies (44.5%). The same 
conclusion can be drawn from figure 3, which shows 
the frequency of use, classified in the above 
described classes. In none of the classes ICT 
companies reached the highest frequency of use. 
36,0%
41,1%
66,5%
55,6%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
organizational
measures 
before use
organizational
measures 
during use
hardware
measures 
sof tware
measures
Security measure classes
ICT companies
service enterprises
federal authorities
industrial enterprise
commercial enterprises
Used security measures in percentage terms
(nC = 80)
Figure 3. Frequency of use depending on branches and 
measure classes 
Hypothesis 4:  Enterprises and federal authorities 
with an IT security management 
use more security measures than 
institutions without a security 
division. 
The institutionalization of IT security manage-
ment acts as an enabler for the coordinated planning, 
implementation and monitoring of security of IT 
infrastructure as a whole. Main objective is to 
guarantee a desired security level permanently. But 
an ongoing development of IT security know-how is 
a necessary prerequisite. 36 of 80 participants 
(45.0%) have such a division or department. We 
assumed that these institutions use more security 
measures than institutions without an IT security 
division.  
We found that the institutions with an IT security 
management use average 45.5% of our mentioned 
security measures. Institutions without such an IT 
security department use only 32.0%. An extremely 
strong correlation was found between the presence of 
IT security management and organizational measures 
(see figure 4). 
32,0%
60,6%
29,6%
51,2%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
without 
IT-security 
management
with 
IT-security 
management
sof tware measures
hardware measures 
organizational 
measures during use
organizational 
measures before use
(nC = 80)
Used security measures in percentage terms
Enterprises and 
federal authorities 
Figure 4. Frequency of use of security measures 
depending on the existence of an IT security 
management division 
Hypothesis 5:  The bigger an institution is the 
more it applies WLAN security 
measures.
Large enterprises and federal authorities have 
normally one or more IT departments and therefore a 
higher number of IT experts compared to smaller 
institutions. That’s why we assumed that the more 
know-how in the field of IT security is reflected in 
the number of used WLAN security measures.  
Figure 5 shows that the above expressed 
assumption cannot be verified. The degree of 
familiarity of WLAN security measures is the 
highest in large enterprise (73.1%) but this not 
considerably more than in smaller institutions 
(72.4%). On the other hand, if we consider the 
frequency of use we found the small institutions 
leading the list. 
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large institutions
( >250 employees)
Known/used security measures in percentage terms
known
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Institutional size
(nC = 80)
Figure 5. Degree of familiarity and frequency of use of 
security measures depending on the institutional size 
But if we take a closer look at individual security 
measures we find correlations between institutional 
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size and the use of security measures. We can 
identify measures which are more often used in large 
institutions as well as measures which are more often 
used by small and micro institutions.  
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Figure 6. Frequency of use of special security measures 
depending on the institutional size 
4. Conclusion 
Our investigation allowed us to derive detailed 
statements concerning the degree of familiarity and 
frequency of use and the main reasons for non-use of 
WLAN security measures in German enterprises and 
federal authorities. The basis was a directory, 
developed by us, which consists of 53 WLAN 
specific security measures. We could also derive 
correlations between the use of these measures and 
institutional characteristics. 
However, we must consider critically, that: a) the 
basis for our investigation, the questioned 
participants, was not a random sample, so we cannot 
make general statements. b) we have not considered 
the difference in effectiveness of the several security 
measures. Our statements are solely based on the 
number of security measures that the participants 
have used. 
But this investigation can be seen as a starting 
point for future research. In the next step we plan to 
do cluster analysis in order to identify typical 
measurement clusters for the protection of WLAN 
infrastructure. Another interesting field of 
investigation is to compare the actual results with the 
findings of our study from 2006 to identify changes 
in using WLAN security measure in German 
enterprises and federal authorities. We plan further, 
comparable surveys. Also a European-wide 
investigation is conceivable. Regular repetitions 
would allow us to identify trends in the WLAN 
security. Another interesting field of investigation is 
to develop our measure directory further. In 
particular, the evaluation of the quality or 
effectiveness of the several security measures is of 
great importance. This would enable us to assess 
WLAN security even better. 
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